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Abstract Cascading effects and cascading disasters are emerging fields of scientific
research. The widespread diffusion of functional networks increases the complexity of
interdependent systems and their vulnerability to large-scale disruptions. Although in
recent years studies of interconnections and chain effects have improved significantly,
cascading phenomena are often associated with the ‘‘toppling domino metaphor’’, or with
high-impact, low-probability events. This paper aimed to support a paradigm shift in the
state of the art by proposing a new theoretical approach to cascading events in terms of
their root causes and lack of predictability. By means of interdisciplinary theory building,
we demonstrate how cascades reflect the ways in which panarchies collapse. We suggest
that the vulnerability of critical infrastructure may orientate the progress of events in
relation to society’s feedback loops, rather than merely being an effect of natural triggers.
Our conclusions point to a paradigm shift in the preparedness phase that could include
escalation points and social nodes, but that also reveals a brand new field of research for
disaster scholars.
Keywords Cascading disasters ! Cascading events ! Critical infrastructure ! Panarchy !
Interdependency ! Vulnerability
1 Introduction
Over the last two decades, the disruption of critical infrastructure (CI) has determined a
progressive change in attitudes to preparedness and emergency management. Until the
early 2000s, the security of assets such as power plants, water supplies and communica-
tions was taken for granted, and the systems were optimised for efficiency and low-cost
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operation, rather than to be resilient (Lewis 2006). Episodes such as the 11 September 2001
terrorist attacks, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the 2005 London bombings and Hurricane
Katrina in 2005 encouraged the implementation of security strategies to protect critical
infrastructure (NATO 2007). However, a new kind of threat emerged that required other
steps. Events such as the eruption of Eyjafjallajo¨kull volcano (2010), the To¯hoku earth-
quake and tsunami (2011), and Hurricane Sandy in 2013 persuaded the world community
to consider ‘‘cascading’’ disasters and their effects upon a globally networked society.
According to Pescaroli and Alexander (2015), this kind of phenomenon is distinguished by
its high level of complexity and the presence of nonlinear paths that lead towards sec-
ondary events (Fig. 1).
In many cases, the overall impact of a crisis is caused by failure or disruption of critical
infrastructure, as happened in the Fukushima nuclear accident, the paralysis of European
aviation associated with Eyjafjallajo¨kull, and the energy distribution crisis triggered by
Superstorm Sandy. In each case, interconnected and interdependent pathways were gen-
erated along which crises propagated and, in doing so, cascades of effects were created
(Helbing 2013). Clearly, the scales are different for each of these examples, and so is their
global reach. Superstorm Sandy had a massive effect, but a regional one; Eyjafjallajo¨kull
affected Europe, an entire continent, with outlying effects in the form of passengers
stranded outside Europe; and the earthquake, tsunami and Fukushima nuclear release led to
consequences that were spread over all the countries and continents with which Japanese
industry interacts. At the largest scale so far, floods in Thailand in 2010 led to a worldwide
shortage of computer components (Chongvilaivan 2012).
In particular, critical infrastructures can be seen as central elements in a widespread
network of risk, because, for the most part, they have physical attributes as well as
functional and organisational ones (Alexander 2013b). They can be associated with
widespread breakdowns, which may cause great harm and may become full-blown
transboundary catastrophes (Boin and Mc Connell 2007; Ansell et al. 2010). In other
words, it is evident that modern technology is being integrated into complex socio-
technological networks that increase the impact of local events upon broader crises
Fig. 1 Visual representation of cascading disasters (Pescaroli and Alexander 2015): a linear path of events
in disasters and b nonlinear path of cascading, including amplification and subsidiary events
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(Egan 2007). In strategic sectors such as energy, telecommunication and transportation, a
development in one part of an infrastructure network can rapidly create much broader
effects by cascading throughout the network and possibly spilling over into other networks
(Amin 2002: 67). In the present day, there is a broadening societal consensus on the need to
maintain critical infrastructure (Comes and Van de Walle 2014). Governments have begun
to understand that relations among elements of infrastructure are key challenges (Van
Eeten et al. 2011), and this is reflected in the mobilisation, in the European Commission’s
(EC’s) Seventh Framework (FP7) and Horizon 2020 programmes, of funds for research on
this issue. However, only a few authors have provided a comprehensive overview of the
critical infrastructure landscape and its associated risk patterns in terms of cascading
disaster (McGee et al. 2014).
In the context of this research, cascades can be defined as sequences of events governed
by cause–effect relationships. As coincidence plays a significant, although rather unpre-
dictable, role in crises (Stallings 2006), the first task in evaluating a cascading disaster is to
ascertain the degree of causality between the elements of the sequence. Disasters are rare
because it is unusual that the independent accumulation of vulnerabilities at different scales
suddenly connects. However, when this occurs, the presence of a line of causality between
diverse incidents and their impacts denotes a cascade. Such is the complexity and level of
independence in modern life that cascading disasters become ever more likely.
Many studies of cascading crises and disasters refer to the ‘‘toppling domino metaphor’’,
which is visualized in Fig. 1, path (a). The usual interpretation of this is that an initial event
sets of a chain of eventualities that, at some point, includes the ‘‘top event’’, or most
disastrous consequence (Khan and Abbasi 2000; Kadri et al. 2014). The principal
assumption in this model is that there is a chain of weakness in which a linear sequence of
events proceeds with unidirectional causality, and all eventualities or incidents are effects
and the triggering event is the primary cause. Most critical infrastructure is too complex for
this model to function adequately. In the rest of this paper, we will endeavour to explain
why that is so and show how the ‘‘toppling domino’’ metaphor is inadequate for complex,
intersecting systems in which there are high degrees of mutual interdependency.
The purpose of this article is to investigate how the progress of a cascading disaster can
be guided by the vulnerability of critical infrastructure, rather than being merely an artefact
of high-impact, low-probability and unexpected events. In other words, our goal is to
contribute to a process of theory building that may help identify complex paths of dis-
ruption and the amplification of crises, not only in terms of functional dependencies and
interdependencies, but also with respect to root causes—and unpredictability. The
methodology of analysis that we propose below is adaptable to different geographical
scales and global reaches and hence takes account of the variation in spatial extent of
cascading disasters. In order to establish the scope of the concept and explain how it is
used, we start by investigating the current state of knowledge about cascading failures of
critical infrastructure. Secondly, we describe some of the interconnections and interde-
pendencies that are likely to lead to the spread of cascades. Lastly, we explain how
vulnerability can determine the path of the cascade and we develop an interdisciplinary,
multi-level theory designed to characterise such phenomena. This will show how a sys-
tematic, holistic approach is needed in order to contain cascades effectively. We believe it
will also help to set the agenda for future research.
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2 Definition of critical facilities and infrastructure in society
There are many definitions of critical infrastructure in the scholarly literature. At the
broadest level, it involves elements that are vital to the operation of society (Alexander
2013b). It consists of ‘‘complex networks, geographically dispersed, nonlinear, and
interacting among themselves and with their human owners, operators, and users’’ (Amin
2002: 67). Besides its purely technical elements, critical infrastructure evolves as processes
in which elements such as nature, culture, society, technology and politics interact
dynamically (Graham 2010). It can be subjected to the direct and indirect effects of
extreme events. The direct effects may involve damage to strategic buildings such as
power plants, and the indirect effects can involve, for example, interruption of services or
loss of capability. It could be argued that critical infrastructure is a ‘‘generator of vul-
nerabilities’’, whose locations and dependencies can propagate risk across geographical
spaces (D’Ercole and Metzger 2009). According to Bouchon (2006), it can be analysed as a
geographical system that is the product of context (e.g. legislation), planning and man-
agement (e.g. material infrastructure), ownership (the logic of development), geographical
constraints (e.g. accessibility) and local background (e.g. environment and political
culture).
NATO (2007) observed that in most countries definitions of critical infrastructure have
evolved over the years in response to differences in national priorities. OECD (2008)
offered a comparison between the definitions used by Australia, Canada, Germany, the
Netherlands, the UK and the USA. Commonly, they associated the word ‘‘critical’’ with the
‘‘infrastructures that are essential to economic and social well-being, public safety and key
governmental functions’’ (OECD 2008: 3). A broader meaning has been acquired by
‘‘infrastructure’’, which may include intangible assets such as supply chains and emer-
gency services. In the Directive on European Critical Infrastructures (EC 2008), the
European Commission defined the components of critical infrastructure as:
An asset, system or part thereof located in Member States which is essential for the
maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, security, economic or social
well-being of people, and the disruption or destruction of which would have a
significant impact in a Member State as a result of the failure to maintain those
functions. (EC 2008: 3).
What emerges is something that associates physical disruption with the loss of func-
tional assets in society. Moreover, official documentation provides an idea of ‘‘European
critical infrastructure’’ (ECI) associated with those elements whose disruption engenders
consequences in more than two member states, as a visible result of cross-sector and cross-
border dependencies (EC 2008). A different approach is reported by the Parliamentary
Assembly of NATO (2007). Here, the focus is on the new dimension acquired by critical
infrastructure protection (CIP) after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the USA,
the attacks on public transportation in London (2005) and Madrid (2004) and the massive
consequences of Hurricane Katrina (2005) in the southern USA and the Indian Ocean
tsunami of 2004. In other words, together with the impact of political decisions associated,
for example, with fluctuations in the energy sector, it is recognised that critical infras-
tructure is sensitive to particular threats, such as disasters or social disorder. This is usually
taken into account in security strategies, risk assessments and risk-mitigation measures
(NATO 2007; OECD 2008; EC 2008).
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2.1 Differences and similarities between the notions of critical infrastructure
and critical facilities
Together with the concept of ‘‘critical infrastructure’’, the literature often makes use of the
term ‘‘critical facilities’’. These draw attention to the social and organisation context, rather
than focussing on the technical assets alone, but the different use could be related more to
institutional praxis than to anything of substance. Indeed, ‘‘critical facilities’’ seem to be
associated with the sectors disaster risk reduction and emergency management more than
with policy and security studies, for which ‘‘critical infrastructure’’ is the more common
epithet. In particular, the Glossary of the United Nations International Strategy on Disaster
Reduction (UNISDR 2009) does not include the term ‘‘critical infrastructure’’ but does
refer to ‘‘critical facilities’’ as:
The primary physical structures, technical facilities and systems which are socially,
economically or operationally essential to the functioning of a society or community,
both in routine circumstances and in the extreme circumstances of an emergency.
(UNISDR 2009: 8–9).
Critical facilities are seen as ‘‘specific elements of the infrastructure that support
essential services in a society’’ (UNISDR 2009: 9), such as water supply and communi-
cation systems or emergency operations centres. The US Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) has adopted the same concept. It includes all public and private facilities
that a community considers essential to the delivery of vital services and to its own
protection (FEMA 2007: 2). In the following pages, we consider the terms ‘‘critical
infrastructure’’ and ‘‘critical facilities’’ as synonyms, but we hope that further discussion of
the definitional issue will take place in the scientific community.
2.2 Operational use of critical infrastructure and facilities
Both critical infrastructure and critical facilities can be classified into sectors and ranks that
reflect their importance in crisis management. Clear examples are derived from the anal-
ysis of two countries, the UK and the USA. The UK Cabinet (2010, 2011) has identified
nine sectors of national critical infrastructure: food, energy, water, communications,
transportation, health, emergency services, government and finance. Other categories of
national significance are civil nuclear facilities, hazardous localities, sites of cultural
importance and companies that maintain information of strategic value to the Government
(UK Cabinet 2011). Once defined, critical national infrastructure is rated on a ‘‘criticality
scale’’ from 0 to 5, where 0 represents a low and 5 a maximum level. Criticality is
measured in terms of (a) the interruption of essential services, (b) what this means in terms
of the resulting economic impact and (c) the impact on daily life. Furthermore, three
factors help define the severity level: (a) the degree of disruption to essential services,
(b) the extent of the disruption in terms of population impacted or geographical spread and
(c) the length of time that the disruption persists. A different approach is used by the US
Government (White House 2013), which lists 16 categories. In order to clarify functions,
roles and responsibilities across the Federal Government and enhance internal coordina-
tion, it has identified dependencies in each sector. At the regional level, the buildings that
need to be reactivated or repaired after disasters are ranked from 1 to 5, where 1 represents
the most critical infrastructure and 5 the least critical (see, for example, Hillsborough
County 2009). It must be noted that the documents considered refer to both public and
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private sites at which there is an assumption of responsibility to assure safety and security
according to current legislation and standards.
Together with their key role in the highly developed countries (HDC), critical infras-
tructures and critical facilities are becoming assets of central importance to the interna-
tional sharing of knowledge. For example, the Peruvian Instituto Nacional de Defencia
Civil et al. (2011) assessed the essential resources for emergency response and recovery in
the metropolis of Lima and Callao in order to plan alternative strategies to compensate for
loss of service. Evidence from elsewhere in South America reported by both D’Ercole and
Metzger (2009), and Metzger and D’Ercole (2011) helped show the Peruvians how human
and material resources affect urban management procedures and how they maintain social
functions associated with vulnerability reduction and the gradual acquisition of resilience.
To sum up, our review shows that the current use of terminology associates critical
infrastructures and facilities with a wider range of attributes than physical buildings alone.
They are seen as central nodes that endow society and the built environment with cohe-
siveness. They catalyse the development of functional sectors, essential services and
technical assets. However, they have to be framed in terms of short- and long-term
strategies that specify the range of criticality and also the responsibilities of management.
The next section will describe these relationships and interdependencies in relation to
cascading events.
3 Critical infrastructures, interdependencies and cascades
Nowadays, many technologies generate socio-technical networks that have distinctive
spatial extents and are integrated into functions such as transportation, communication or
energy supply (Bijker et al. 1987). As they grow more interdependent, they become more
vulnerable to large-scale cascading disruptions across sectoral boundaries (Amin 2002). As
much as the complexity of human space increases with the urbanisation process, in solving
problems there is a need to find redundancy and reliable alternatives (Jha et al. 2013). Here,
the built environment has to be considered as a whole, including the capacity of buildings
both to withstand the impact of hazards and to influence social vulnerability (Johnson
2012). The interdependent nature of many systems significantly complicates this process
and increases the potential for cascading effects and disasters to occur. For example, at a
small scale, a sinkhole in a street can affect underground pipes and disrupt the distribution
of a variety of utilities. If a fire is generated by the broken lines, perhaps it could not be
effectively fought because of the loss of water supply in broken mains. The possible threat
to proprieties and lives posed by the secondary crisis can exceed that caused by the original
trigger (Little 2002).
As a second example, the public utility sector, including government services (e.g.
government offices) and emergency services (e.g. hospitals), involves mutual interde-
pendency but at the same time is interconnected with other networks so as to ensure that
the social system functions (NARUC 2005). In this case, the example includes energy
supply (e.g. a compressor station), electrical power (e.g. power plants), communication
(e.g. switching stations), transportation (e.g. an airport), water (e.g. substations) and
finance (e.g. cash dispensers). Moreover, the criticality of infrastructure results from a wide
spectrum of possible relationships among inter-organisational networks, in which transfer
of resources across physical spaces is related to communication of information between
organisations and individuals (Pelzer and Hempel 2014). If there is insufficient capacity for
Nat Hazards
123
redundancy, or none at all, even isolated failures can generate cascades that involve other
sectors or the whole of society. First, vulnerable equipment and materials such as storage
tanks, transportation pipelines and paperwork can be related to the spreading of secondary
accidents consequent upon natural hazards (Krausmann et al. 2011). Secondly, excessively
prolonged service lives, ageing materials and inadequate maintenance can influence the
robustness of infrastructure (Little 2002). Thirdly, societal resilience is the results of the
human dimension included in critical infrastructure, such as the need for emergency
managers to achieve adequate levels of preparedness and thus the need to train personnel
and leaders (Boin and Mc Connell 2007).
Some forms of critical infrastructure represent potential hazards in their own right:
nuclear power plants, wastewater treatment facilities and biochemical manufacturing
plants are distinguished by the use of polluting material that can damage the environment
and health if it is released. For example, during the 2002 floods in central Europe, inun-
dation of the Spolana chemical plant in the Czech Republic caused a major secondary
event in the form of a serious pollution hazard. This had a significant effect upon the
progress of international emergency relief (Pescaroli and Alexander 2015). In contrast, the
critical infrastructure related to social sectors is more easily associated with long-range and
multiple-level disruptions. Luiijf et al. (2009) analysed a data set of 1749 critical infras-
tructure failures in 29 European nations, 95 % of which post-dated the year 2000. It
emerged that cascades are fairly common and there are clear pathways of spreading. These
authors found that the energy sector accounts for 60 % of all cascades, 28 % originate in
the telecommunication and Internet sectors, 5 % come from the transportation sector, and
3 % are found in the water sector (Luiijf et al. 2009: 305). Triggers in the energy sector
generated an average of 2.06 disruptions in other forms of critical infrastructure, and those
in telecommunication caused an average of 1.86 disruptions in other sectors. In this study,
each cascading effect was analysed as a disruption consequent upon the preceding event
that initiated it. However, the authors were more intent on identifying and classifying
cascading effects (by category, such as education, financial services and industry) rather
than determining how they occurred and by what pathways. The study tended to assume
linear effects, but did not analyse and verify that this was the case. Moreover, they
quantified cascades (in relative percentage terms) merely on the basis of reports of their
occurrence rather than on any more sophisticated enquiry. This is understandable, given
the large number of events with which they were dealing.
The same observations apply to the study by Van Eeten et al. (2011), who provided
similar evidence in terms of an analysis of 830 reports of incidents in the Netherlands. In
this case, more than 47 % of all cascades originate within the energy sector, 44 % within
telecommunications and the Internet, and 3.2 % in transportation. Energy and telecom-
munications trigger disruptions in other critical infrastructure sectors in line with the
figures provided by Luiijf et al. (2009). However, if telecommunication services suffer
from energy outages, the reverse is not necessarily true. The different behaviours of the
energy sector in the Netherlands can be related to legislation and governmental actions that
have created a more reliable transmission grid that exists in other countries (Van Eeten
et al. 2011).
Other studies have brought together a wider spectrum of evidence about the key
pathways of cascades at the global level. For example, in analysing the impact of Hurricane
Sandy in 2012, Kunz et al. (2013) showed that there was a broad dependency on power and
ITC systems, while in the food, beverage and tobacco sector, there was a total dependency
on transportation. Sandy demonstrated that, once again, the system of critical infrastructure
is heavily dependent on electrical power and, as a whole, is extremely vulnerable to natural
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hazards (Comes and Van de Walle 2014). Impacts on energy supply generate consequences
for telecommunications, the oil and gas industry and transportation which indirectly
generate disruption and long-term cascading loops that reinforce the disruption (Comes and
Van de Walle 2014). Around 50 fatalities were associated with extended power outages
consequent upon Hurricane Sandy and ensuing cold weather (Blake et al. 2013).
In the case of cross-boundary crises, the role of telecommunications appears to be
slightly different. For example, in December 2006 a small sea-floor earthquake in the south
of Taiwan damaged submarine cables used for telephone services and Internet transmission
across much of East and Southeast Asia. The consequences spread to Taiwan, Hong Kong,
Japan, China, Singapore and South Korea. There were substantial economic implications,
as transactions made on international financial markets were adversely affected (Smith and
Petley 2009). Emerging threats include the sensitivity of hi-tech infrastructures such as
satellites or power lines to natural events such as geomagnetic storms and other forms of
‘‘space weather’’ (OECD 2011).
Some other issues relate to transportation. In this context, both Van Eeten et al. 2011
and Luiijf et al. (2009) attributed a small but significant percentage of disruption to
infrastructure as the originator of cascades. The ‘‘just-in-time’’ economic model that relies
on the global continuity of supply can be regarded as a part of this problem. When physical
damage caused by natural hazards or technical breakdown undermine long-range logistics,
delays and failures may spread across interconnected supply chains and thus throughout
society (OECD 2011). The 2010 eruption of Eyjafjallajo¨kull and the consequent disruption
of air transportation showed how this sector can compromise many levels of social,
political and economic activities in Europe, with global consequences (Alexander 2013a).
Eight and a half million people were stranded, airlines risked bankruptcy, official political
campaigns were cancelled, cultural events were suspended, and major sporting events were
postponed. The leading logistics couriers, such as DHL Express, were grounded and had to
find alternative routes by ship or road. Supply problems led to shortages of electronic
hardware and restricted the import and export of perishable goods such as fruit, vegetables,
flowers and bone marrow (for transplant).
4 Complex adaptive systems, panarchies and cascading disasters
So far in this article, we have reviewed the different attributes of cascades in critical
infrastructure. This section will propose a systems model of their role. Rinaldi et al. (2001)
defined the interdependencies among critical infrastructures as complex adaptive systems
(CAS), meaning ‘‘complex collections of interacting components in which change often
occurs as a result of learning processes and where each component of an infrastructure
constitutes a small part of the intricate web that forms the overall infrastructure’’ (Rinaldi
et al. 2001: 13). According to these authors, the various components of critical infras-
tructure function as agents that interact according to their location in geographical space,
capabilities (for example pumping capacity) and memory (the result of experiences such as
degradation by overuse). Through inputs (i.e. resources to be used) and outputs (i.e.
products), they communicate with the other elements of infrastructure, but they are indi-
vidually capable of learning from the past and adapting to the future (e.g. enabling per-
sonnel to improve their training or adopting new technologies for monitoring).
The physical and organisational elements of infrastructure interact with the functional
aspects but have to be referred to their contextual drivers, such as environment, politics and
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social milieu (Rinaldi et al. 2001). Critical infrastructure has to be analysed as a series of
points that accumulate different attributes and levels of complexity. The vulnerability of
sub-systems is a function of the way the entire assemblage works (Bouchon 2006). This
implies a need to broaden the perspective on the possible role of critical infrastructure in
cascades.
According to Holling (2001), the adaptive cycles that maintain evolutionary capacity in
ecology alternate periods of accumulation and transformation of resources with shorter
periods in which the accumulated potential is released, perhaps by means of a crisis.
‘‘Adaptive capacity’’ is a measure of the vulnerability and resilience of the system to
unexpected or unpredictable shocks. A nested set of adaptive cycles that evolves
dynamically is described by the term ‘‘panarchy’’. The functioning of the adaptive cycles
and the way they communicate with each other can be related to sustainability (Holling
2001). However, the metaphor does not imply fixed or regular cycles but assumes that
some of the interaction occurs at multiple scales of time and physical dimensions (Walker
et al. 2004). When a level of the system initiates ‘‘creative destruction’’, and the other
levels have accumulated vulnerabilities and rigidities, the crisis spreads across the system
towards a ‘‘panarchical collapse’’. Once thresholds are crossed, cascading effects are
generated with consequent regime shifts across scales and domains (Kinzig et al. 2006).
Holling (2001, p. 404) defined these circumstances symbolically as an ‘‘alignment of the
stars’’. By this, he meant that hazard and vulnerability have to interact at different scales. In
our opinion, the definition can easily be associated with the evidence for cascading dis-
asters and their impact upon critical infrastructure. Unaligned vulnerabilities would stop
the propagation of impacts: aligned vulnerabilities would facilitate it. This point will be
illustrated with two examples, which are important for the concepts of both complex
adaptive cycles and panarchy in relation to critical infrastructure and disasters.
Scale issues and the role of vulnerability are illustrated in Fig. 2. This takes Holling’s
‘‘Mo¨bius strip’’ diagram of system functions in an adaptive cycle (exploitation–conser-
vation–reorganisation–release—Holling 2001, p. 394) and shows how it fits with diverse
Fig. 2 Different scales, feedbacks and vulnerability paths in cascading disasters
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time and space scales. These are the scales and domains that cascading effects traverse. In
this diagram, the domain of critical infrastructure exists between its controlling factors,
above, and its impacts, below. The arrows denote feedback in either direction.
It must be noted that our approach is not in contradiction with Perrow’s theory of
normal accidents (1999). Indeed, in high-risk technological systems ‘‘neither better orga-
nization nor technological innovations appear to make them less prone to system acci-
dents’’ (Perrow 1999, p. 5), and ‘‘given the system characteristics, multiple and unexpected
interaction of failures are inevitable’’ (Perrow 1999, p. 5). This is exactly what can be seen
in Fig. 2 with some differences: in our perspective, cascading disasters are a consequence
of vulnerabilities accumulated in different scales, which are manifested when breaking
points are aligned. In other words, it is true that coincidences exist and it is impossible to
monitor all the components of the system, such as a small pipe that broke in the wrong
moment, but cascading events seems to be driven by a path waiting to happen and rooted in
far more complex social issues.
The technical failure that started the notorious blackout of 2003 in North America was a
result of the joint effect of production pressures, failure of regulatory authority, lack of risk
assessment, lack of coordination among actors, and scarce consideration of precursors
(Dien and Duval 2014). The accumulation of rigidities became evident when a heat wave
suddenly increased the demand for energy, which required adaptation of the network to
new environmental conditions which could not be achieved in time. Lack of compatibility
of the timescales of impact and avoidance behaviour led to the crisis. Accumulated rigidity
existed in the inability to adapt to demand caused by a change in the weather.
Similarly, in 2010, when the eruption of Eyjafjallajo¨kull created the biggest disruption
of air transportation since WWII, millions of passengers were left stranded because there
was insufficient adaptive capacity in society. Commercial aviation had not been adequately
coordinated or harmonised with other forms of transportation and hospitality (Parker 2014)
to cope with the stranding of passengers. Concurrently, the ‘‘just-in-time’’ economic model
that relies on the global continuity of supply relies significantly on air transportation and
has airports as some of its most important nodes (Alexander 2013a). Airports and flights
were then the points at which the rigidities of the transportation sector were concentrated
and manifest in the form of technological and organisational fragilities.
Individual critical infrastructures (such as electricity generation and distribution or food
supply) are complex adaptive systems with different parameters and different speeds of
recovery following disruption. The density of the networks varies, and so do the rates of
response to perturbations of the system. However, there are obvious interdependencies
between the systems, such as the need for electricity supply in order to refrigerate food.
There is a need to understand the cycles of functioning of each CI system and the vital
points of contact with, and dependency upon, other systems. Failure at the points of mutual
dependency will propagate a lag in the recovery process, and that is in addition to lags
propagated by movement down a single system, for example, from the national to the local
level. A considerable challenge is inherent in this concept: to understand how complex
systems adapt to the forces that drive them, and simultaneously to understand how they
adapt to each other through complex interdependencies.
We argue that cascading disasters have similar dynamics to the spread of crisis in
panarchies: an environmental hazard or other threat can be a trigger of dynamic processes
that weaken the system. Society and its components (e.g. policies, organisations and
economics) occupy the intermediate levels between localised infrastructure and interna-
tional interdependencies. Nodes in critical infrastructure amplify the structural weaknesses
by transmitting them across scales. Cascades may result from a lack of sustainability in the
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system, for example where they are associated with long-range supply processes, man-
agement cultures or to consumer behaviour. On the one hand, this is in line with the idea
that cascading ecological crises, such as those related to climate change, are nonlinear
consequences of complex causal chains in which environmental dynamics react to human
stressors (Galaz et al. 2011). On the other hand, cascading effects accompany a transition
from a stable to an unstable state of the system and are amplified by latent vulnerabilities,
such as the increasing interdependency of functional sectors in modern global society
(Helbing 2013).
The power outage of 2003 in Italy furnishes an example of scale effects in critical
infrastructure cascades. On the night of 28 September 2003, electricity was being imported
into Italy from Switzerland via three routes. A short circuit occurred when one trans-
mission line overheated and touched the branch of a tree. Transmission automatically
switched to the other two lines and then shut itself down to prevent them from overheating
too. A series of blackouts propagated from the Swiss–Italian border progressively as far as
Sicily and Geneva, affecting 56 million people. Trains were marooned in tunnels, and
people were trapped in elevators. Civil aviation was briefly shut down. In this example, a
very localised fault rapidly spread to the level of international system-wide effects.
Transportation, health systems, the Internet and building maintenance were affected, and
lack of refrigeration put foodstuffs at risk. However, as the blackout occurred in the night
on a Sunday morning, many effects were localised and hence on the scale of the original
fault. Nevertheless, loss of electrical power to the Internet propagated failure at power
stations through inability to transmit control data (Bacher and Na¨f 2003). The extraordi-
nary extent of the power failure was the result of cascades in independent networks being
transmitted to each other through the nodes of contact (Buldyrev et al. 2010).
In order to understand the evolution of the system, three contributing factors must be
considered determinant: interactions within in the system, context such as institutional
conditions, and a triggering event, which may show that random factors can determine the
temporal evolution of the system (Helbing 2013: 54). To sum up, we argue that the
interdependencies among critical infrastructure in the form of complex adaptive systems
(Rinaldi et al. 2001) can be seen as the nodes that concentrate micro- and macro-dynamics
that join together panarchies, globally networked risks and cross-scale interactions. Cas-
cades are more the product of an ‘‘alignment of stars’’, as Holling would have it, than to
unexpected, low-probability, high-impact events. Although it can be argued the existence
of ‘‘normal accidents’’ (Perrow 1999), we think cascading could be significantly more
dependent by contextual dynamics that relate the single components to cross-scale inter-
actions. When a triggering event happens, they progress by unsolved vulnerabilities that
are concentrated in critical infrastructure. They recombine and generate a nonlinear pro-
gression of events that amplify the overall impact of disasters. However, they are usually
deeply rooted in pre-existing factors, as analysed in the next section.
5 Vulnerability path
The previous sections of this paper defined critical infrastructure and explained its possible
role in the spread of cascading disasters. This section will concentrate on understanding
vulnerability as a sort of directional path. In one of the most widely used books on disaster
reduction, Wisner et al. (2003) suggested that different levels of vulnerability have to be
considered if one is to identify the root causes of disaster, and they are determined by
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social systems and power relations, not natural forces (Wisner et al. 2003: 7). They can be
generated by processes that operate at different spatial and temporal scales, including
national and international ones. According to these authors, vulnerability is a phenomenon
that has multiple layers and different ways in which it progresses. It can be seen as the
result of interactions among root causes, some of which are inherent in cultures and some
in economic models, dynamic pressures (e.g. dependencies on critical systems) and unsafe
conditions (e.g. precarious margins of production).
The thematic spheres of economy, social activity and environment must be considered
as a whole by including organisational and institutional aspects as well as environmental
and social ones (Birkmann 2007). However, it should be noted that vulnerability reduction
strategies and mitigation options are conditioned by political choices and cultural con-
straints. Moreover, pervasive weaknesses in organisational structures directly influence
levels of vulnerability and a system’s capacity to react to a crisis, from the chain of
command and control that organises preparedness and relief, to the state of critical
infrastructure that can profoundly affect both the delivery of aid and welfare and the spread
of secondary disasters. In other words, adopting the wrong measures or making unwise
political and economic decisions can be seen to be an overall cause of disaster (Green
2005).
Political decision making is usually embedded in local or national culture, and those two
factors can mutually influence each other. Cruz (2012) reported that, even where imple-
mentation is the preserve of experts, the adoption of building codes and standards is more
likely to succeed if there is effective social demand for safety or there are the resources to
apply the measures properly. In particular, in critical infrastructure, vulnerability reduction
strategies may enter into conflict with a series of pre-existing routines and priorities that
orient the decision-making process of citizens, organisations and politicians (Boin and Mc
Connell 2007). It is essential to use a vulnerability assessment process to understand the
pattern and path of such factors during periods of quiescence, and above all shortly before
an extreme event (Johnston et al. 2006). This must involve the joint efforts of technical
specialists, managers and public authorities in order to understand how critical infras-
tructure is vulnerable and how it loss will affect society. Hence, appropriate channels need
to be utilised to educate the population, train personnel, involve the community and define
the responsibilities of stakeholders. The key areas are public education, land-use control,
government policy on critical and public facilities, land and property acquisition, building
codes, safety standards and research (Johnston et al. 2006: 63). Because incompetence and
corruption generate common failings that involve the social context, the effectiveness of
government may be a crucial issue (Smith and Petley 2009).
Hellstro¨m (2007) adapted the model by Wisner et al. (2003) and defined critical
infrastructure as a set of technological systems that fulfil social functions according to four
principles: functional interlocking, dependencies and interdependencies among systems);
temporal embeddedness (the depth of the changes required by innovation in the techno-
logical systems); critical socio-technical tipping-points (strategic connections, thresholds
and interactions between society and technology); and dynamic and reversible effects (how
root causes and unsafe conditions become dynamic pressures). This approach extended the
‘‘pressure-and-release’’ model of Wisner et al. (2003) to new forms of technological
progress. It seems to confirm the association of Holling’s ‘‘alignment of stars’’ (2001) in
terms of cascading disasters (Pescaroli and Alexander 2015). Hazard impacts tend to be
dependent on pre-existing vulnerability factors, and the aggregation of vulnerabilities and
pressures at some point of the system are the trigger of crisis or disaster (Hellstro¨m 2007:
427). Alexander (2000) showed how feedback processes in political, technological social
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and cultural contexts can favour unprotected development and inhibit mitigation (Fig. 3).
When the mitigating factors provided by knowledge and good governance are over-
whelmed by negative factors such as negligence and increases in vulnerability, losses are
hard to avoid.
This dynamic seems to be recurrent. For example, negligence was a significant factor
that determined the Fukushima meltdown (Synolakis and Kaˆnoðlu 2015), but it was also a
factor in the secondary disasters caused by the 2002 floods in the Czech Republic (Pes-
caroli and Alexander 2015). The absence of international coordination during the dis-
ruption of European civil aviation resulting from the 2010 volcanic eruption in Iceland did
not happen by chance (Alexander 2013a; Parker 2014), but was the output of clear political
choices that failed to take account of a concrete and plausible risk. In fact, it can be argued
that human failures or structural vulnerabilities are visible in most disasters in which
cascading effects are present, and they are often associated with low levels of institutional
accountability. The evidence to support this approach can provide by the most famous
among the cascading events, the meltdown of the Fukushima Daı¨chi Nuclear Power Plant,
which followed the To¯hoku earthquake and tsunami of March 2011. In the official doc-
umentation of the National Diet of Japan Fukushima (2012), it was stated that: ‘‘The
TEPCO Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident was the result of collusion between the
government, the regulators and TEPCO, and the lack of governance by said parties…
Therefore, we conclude that the accident was clearly ‘manmade’’’ (National Diet of Japan
Fukushima 2012: 16). Root causes were associated with the organisational and regulatory
system, but also with the failure to take a series of preventative measures such as the
adaptation of flood barriers to new risk scenarios. The Commission revealed that, even if
they were aware of the risk, the protagonists failed to develop the basic safety require-
ments, to implement structural reinforcements or adopt adequate protection measures.
Fig. 3 Vicious circle of increases in vulnerability: a positive feedback situation (source: Alexander 2000)
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However, the Fukushima case suggests that there should be a focus that is broad enough to
include another critical element: the society in charge of the nuclear power plant (TEPCO)
and the governmental bodies in charge of monitoring safety levels ‘‘postponed putting
safety measures in place, or made decisions based on their organisation’s self-interest, and
not in the interest of public safety’’ (National Diet of Japan Fukushima 2012: 16). The
resilience of infrastructure can be compromised by preferring a logic of maximum profit or
assiduously following the ‘‘predatory models of neoliberal financial capital’’ (Graham
2010: 14).
A recurrent problem is that interdependent networks have been ‘‘consistently pushed to
the edge of their design envelopes, under pressure to maximise, if not optimise, their
performance’’ (Schulman et al. 2004). For example, Dien and Duval (2014) showed that, in
both the blackout in North America in 2003 and the near miss at the Davis Besse nuclear
power station in 2002, the pressure on productivity caused performance to be put before
safety. This occurred in correspondence with different levels of organisational and man-
agement failures: a weakness of the regulatory authorities, lack of risk assessment and
training, limitations on feedback from the operating environment, and poor coordination
among operators. In other words, the vulnerability of critical infrastructure cannot be
related only to the built environment but must also be connected to the different levels of
responsibility and human interaction: pre- and post-emergency management, urban and
infrastructural planning, and political and social visions (Graham 2010).
6 Conclusion
In line with Holling (2001), we have endeavoured to show how cascading disaster can be
seen as an ‘‘alignment of stars’’ in socio-ecological systems. The diffusion of consequences
appears to be determined by vulnerabilities that are latent in global society (Helbing 2013),
which may be manifest in complex and secondary events (Pescaroli and Alexander 2015).
Despite the common conception that cascading disasters are unexpected low-probability,
high-impact events, in our opinion they are well rooted in society’s feedback loops
(Alexander 2000). Elements such as corruption, negligence, maximisation of profit and the
structural weaknesses of the global socio-economic system should be seen as causes to be
studied and addressed. In practical terms, the role of critical infrastructure in cascading
disasters suggests that it is necessary to create a new culture of preparedness at the
international level, for many of the scenarios involve international transboundary crises.
We argue that, although because of their high complexity and cross-scale dynamics
cascading disasters cannot be prevented, latent vulnerability can be understood and
addressed before the trigger events occur. We need to broaden the consensus on the
development of new tools and strategies. The literature shows that neither vulnerability
assessment (Little 2002) nor contingency planning (Boin and Mc Connell 2007) are suf-
ficient on their own. It can be true that sometimes ‘‘the problem is just something that never
occurred to the designer’’ (Perrow 1999), but how to tackle the ‘‘alignment of stars’’ that
generate the cascade? We suggest shift attention from risk scenarios based on hazard to
vulnerability scenarios based on potential escalation points. That is to say, we cannot know
which events can happen at the macroscopic level, but we can identify the sensitive nodes
that are capable of generating secondary events at the smallest scale. This point presents
significant methodological challenges, but the final output could be used to highlight the
weakest nodes that are most significant when cascades are generated. It could help create
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common rankings of critical infrastructure based on interdependencies and hazard poten-
tials and thus help to improve existing rankings (UK Cabinet 2011). For example, if
authorities, organisations and managers are able to improve the way they exchange
information on critical infrastructure, this will improve their ability to recognise and deal
with the triggers of the kinds of crisis that have widespread effects among the many users
of the infrastructure in question. Moreover, instead of generating reasonable worst-case
scenarios based on the initial triggers, we could shift the emphasis to reasonable worst-case
amplification scenarios.
If a systems perspective such as that offered by Holling (2001) is adopted, cascading
disasters can be seen as a manifestation of a lack of sustainability in adaptive and evo-
lutionary processes. The sensitivity of global supply in the energy and transportation
sectors to localised disruption underlines this point, but further discussion and research are
needed in order to clarify and test the concept. Our theoretical approach has many limi-
tations, including the difficulty of establishing cause and effect in complex situations, the
challenge of modelling the complexity of interactions among parallel systems of critical
infrastructure, and the difficulty of translating effects from one scale to another. However,
as these are mostly limitations based on the need to fill in details, we argue that they do not
invalidate our findings. Although lack of training and management technique are key
drivers of vulnerability, we must also consider the need for a wider integration of social
behaviour and community-based perspectives. Further research is needed in order to
ascertain whether cascading ecological crisis models are fully applicable to situations in
which the hazards revolve around malfunctioning (Galaz et al. 2011). Early warning, the
behaviour of operators, communication failures and bureaucratic conflicts are some of the
areas in which further research could help us to understand how cascading disasters
propagate in critical infrastructure, and how their progress can be arrested.
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